The supreme court's pragmatism in olowe vs aluko
A dangerous dilution of legal certainty
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Olowe v. Aluko redefined Nigeria’s jurisprudence on the validity of court processes signed in a law firm’s name. By upholding a Statement of Claim signed under Akeredolu & Olujimi, the Court moderated the rigidity of earlier precedents in Okafor v. Nweke and SLB Consortium v. NNPC. This article critically evaluates the Court’s reasoning in light of the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA) and Order 8 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Rules and interrogates the uncertainty now surrounding processes signed under firm names such as “Ejike & Co” as an example. It assesses the Court’s ratio, examines arguments for and against the ruling, and situates it within Nigeria’s broader jurisprudence on jurisdiction, procedure, and statutory interpretation. The article concludes that while the decision advances substantive justice, it simultaneously unsettles doctrinal clarity and underscores the urgent need for legislative reform. The validity of legal processes has always been central to Nigerian procedural law. A recurrent question has been whether a writ or statement of claim signed in a law firm’s name, rather than an individual practitioner, is competent. In Okafor v. Nweke (2007), the Court held such processes to be void ab initio, a position reaffirmed in SLB Consortium Ltd v. NNPC (2011).
Yet in Olowe & Anor v. Aluko, the Court charted a new course. Faced with a seventy (70) year old land dispute, the apex Court upheld a Statement of Claim signed in the name of Akeredolu & Olujimi. The Court reasoned that because “Akeredolu” and “Olujimi” were traceable, identifiable practitioners duly enrolled at the Bar, the requirements of the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA) were satisfied.
Yet in Olowe & Anor v. Aluko, the Court charted a new course. Faced with a seventy (70) year old land dispute, the apex Court upheld a Statement of Claim signed in the name of Akeredolu & Olujimi. The Court reasoned that because “Akeredolu” and “Olujimi” were traceable, identifiable practitioners duly enrolled at the Bar, the requirements of the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA) were satisfied.
This pragmatic approach marks a departure from the earlier orthodoxy established in Okafor v. Nweke and SLB Consortium Ltd v. NNPC. While the judgment prevents injustice in protracted litigation, it also raises troubling questions about doctrinal consistency, legal certainty, and the erosion of procedural discipline in Nigerian legal practice. At stake is the delicate balance between the sanctity of procedural law on the one hand, and the demands of substantive justice on the other.
The supreme court's reasoning and ratio
The core issue before the Court was whether the Statement of Claim filed by the Respondent in Suit No. HIL/66/94 was incompetent, having been signed in the name of Akeredolu & Olujimi, a law firm. The Appellants relying on the authority of Okafor v. Nweke, argued that only a person recognized under Sections 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act (“LPA”) could sign processes. Delivering the leading Judgment, Per Mohammed Baba Idris, JSC, reaffirmed the general principle that a process signed in a law firm’s name is void.
However, he distinguished the instant case from Okafor. His lordship reasoned that where the names used are traceable to specific individuals who are duly enrolled legal practitioners, the mischief intended to be addressed by the LPA does not arise. The Court found that the writ was signed by Akin Olujimi, Esq.,while the Statement of Claim bore the names of Rotimi Akeredolu, SAN, and Olujimi, both undisputedly qualified practitioners.
The Court thus held that the statutory requirement was met, since “Akeredolu” and “Olujimi” were identifiable as legal practitioners on the Roll. His reasoning leaned on Sections 2(1) and 24 of the LPA and a literal reading that once a name traceable to a practitioner appears, the process is competent. Thus, the Court upheld the competence of the Statement of Claim, affirming the lower courts’ decisions in favour of the Respondent and granting possession, damages for trespass, and injunctive relief.
Pragmatism over technicality
Supporters of the judgment will rightly argue that the Court has embraced common sense. In Olowe v. Aluko, the firm in question Akeredolu & Olujimi was not a nebulous or faceless entity. Both Chief Rotimi Akeredolu, SAN, and Chief Akin Olujimi, SAN, are not only identifiable but are also luminaries of the Nigerian Bar, enrolled since the 1970s. To invalidate a process bearing their names, merely because it carried the firm’s name rather than an individual’s signature, would amount to a triumph of form over substance. This reasoning aligns with a broader judicial philosophy that justice should not be sacrificed at the altar of procedural rigidity.
After all, Section 6 of the Constitution entrusts the courts with doing “substantial justice.” If the names on the process can be directly linked to known practitioners, then the mischief sought to be cured by Okafor v. Nweke does not exist and the danger of quacks and impostors filing court documents simply does not arise.The judgment also prevents unnecessary litigation delays. Imagine striking out a claim in a 30-year-old land dispute on the hyper-technical ground that the firm’s name, though composed of enrolled practitioners, was used instead of a sole practitioner’s signature. Such an outcome would offend public confidence in the judicial process and waste scarce judicial time. In this light, the decision reflects judicial pragmatism and a modern appreciation of how law firms actually operate.
Dilution of legal certainty
Yet, for all its pragmatism, the decision is not without grave shortcomings. The Supreme Court’s shift effectively carves out an exception to a rule it once held to be sacrosanct: that only legal practitioners whose names are on the Roll may sign court processes. In Okafor v. Nweke, the Court underscored the need for certainty and discipline in legal practice. By watering down this rule, the Court risks creating a slippery slope where the line between validity and nullity becomes blurred.
Firstly, the judgment introduces ambiguity. If Akeredolu & Olujimi is valid because its name is traceable to enrolled practitioners, what of firms with names such as “Ejike and Co”? Must the courts embark on fact-finding to verify whether each surname corresponds to an enrolled practitioner? What if one partner is retired, suspended, or deceased? Would the validity of the process then be impugned? More disturbing is the question of whether this rule applies to not so popular legal practitioners. Given that in this case, the legal practitioners are quite popular. What becomes the fate of “not so popular” legal practitioners? Again, must the courts embark on fact-finding to verify whether each surname corresponds to an enrolled practitioner? This uncertainty undermines predictability, which is the lifeblood of procedural law.
Secondly, the decision undermines the discipline of precision that Okafor v. Nweke instilled in the Bar. That case, though harsh, had a salutary effect. It compelled law firms to adopt best practices and ensure that their processes bore the clear signatures of identifiable lawyers. By softening this stance, the court inadvertently invites complacency, with counsel potentially lapsing into casual drafting practices under the comfort of judicial indulgence. Thirdly, the judgment arguably contradicts the letter of the Legal Practitioners Act (LPA). Section 2(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act (Cap L11, LFN 2004) provides expressly as follows:
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, a person shall be entitled to practice as a barrister and solicitor if, and only if, his name is on the roll.”
This means that only those whose names are on the Roll of Legal Practitioners (kept by the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Nigeria) are entitled to practice law in Nigeria. Anyone not on the Roll even if they studied law cannot sign court processes or appears counsel. Section 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act (Interpretation Section) also provides that:
“ Legal practitioner” means a person entitled in accordance with the provisions of this Act to practice as a barrister or as a barrister and solicitor either generally or for the purposes of any particular office or proceedings.”
From the above definition, “legal practitioner” is strictly a person called to the Nigerian Bar and enrolled on the Roll. Law firms (e.g., “XYZ & QRS.”) are not “persons” under the Act and they cannot sign processes. This distinction has been the basis of the rule that only individual lawyers (not firms) can sign court processes. Thus, a law firm, regardless of whether it is named after practitioners, is not “a person” recognized by law. By extending validity to firms with identifiable names, the Court risks engaging in judicial legislation, reading into the Act what it does not say. Moreso, Order 8 Rule 2(3)(a) of the FCT High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and similar provisions across jurisdictions provides:
“Each copy of an originating process shall be signed by a legal practitioner………..”.”
By extending validity to firms with identifiable names, the Court risks engaging in judicial legislation, reading into the Act what it does not say. Moreso, Order 8 Rule 2(3)(a) of the FCT High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and similar provisions across jurisdictions provides: The wording “Legal Practitioner” is sacrosanct. It s tates “ Legal Practitioner” not “Law Firm” and clearly envisages an individual, not a corporate identity. The ratio in Olowe v. Aluko therefore sits uneasily with the procedural rules, leaving ambiguity as to whether a firm’s endorsement without the additional particulars still suffices.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s decision in Olowe & Anor v. Aluko reflects a commendable effort to balance substantive justice with procedural regularity. However, by carving out an exception to the once-settled rule in Okafor v. Nweke, the Court has inadvertently introduced uncertainty into Nigerian procedural law, weakened professional discipline, and blurred the line between judicial interpretation and legislative action. The conflict with Order 8 Rule 2 and the “Ejike & Co” problem expose this doctrinal fragility. While the judgment may stand as a pragmatic solution in this particular dispute, its long-term sustainability is doubtful.
Legislative reform of the LPA and Civil Procedure Rules is urgently required to settle the matter decisively, for the Nigerian legal system to remain both just and predictable, ambiguities like this should be avoided at all cost. Until then, caution dictates that legal practitioners must continue to sign processes strictly in their personal names and enrolment numbers, thereby safeguarding both substantive justice and legal certainty.
Authors
Caleb Nicholas Echoga
Echoga Caleb is the Managing Partner of Chayfiled Law Practice where he also doubles as the Team Lead of the firm's Corporate and Commercial Law Practice.Caleb is a transactional attorney also having solid expertise in commercial litigation which has seen him advise and represent diverse clients in a plethora of transactions. Beyond his interest in law, Caleb is an avid reader and an excellent table tennis player.
Ukechi Jackson Wali
Ukechi is an associate at Chayfield Law Practice and a solid member of the Firm's Corporate and Commercial Practice. She equally has commendable expertise in criminal law and human rights law.